An Ontological Triangle: Catholic, Protestant, and Atheist

In the opening pages of his, Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme (St. Paul: the Foundation of Universalism), Alain Badiou writes, “Un catholique, un protestant. Qu’ils fassent triangle avec l’athée.” (“A Catholic, a Protestant. May they make a triangle with the atheist.”)  Taking this quite literally, I thought it would be interesting to make a visual of this triangle. Of course one always runs a huge risk when attempting to explain abstract philosophical concepts using visuals, but nonetheless I had fun doing it. So here it is:

Any suggestions to make this more accurate?

Augustine, “On the Literal Meaning of Genesis:” a Warning Against ‘Fundamentalism.’

I take no credit for this blog. This text was brought to my attention by Dr. Simon Oliver in a seminar on Creation. I should note this is in no way meant to be a full-on critique of the modern misunderstandings of the relations of science and theology, but nonetheless some of my readers will take it that way! A simple blog entry will never do justice to this topic. What I want to suggest, following those much more qualified than myself, is that this relationship is utterly misconstrued by “natural” theologians such as William Paley (who is pummelled by Hume), but begins with theologians as far back as the Middle Ages. I hope that a short reading of Augustine will shed light on the church father’s understanding of this relationship, and its relevance for us today. (I can recommend readings to people who are honestly interested.)

The relationship of theology and science is very popular in pop culture Christianity. I think the general anxiety among Christians can be reduced (I hate that word) to this question: “Does evolution (science) discredited my faith?” This question presupposes the illusion that religion is constantly quarreling with science. But this is to look too narrowly upon the issue. The relationship of science and theology is much more intimate than this…

Nearly 1600 years ago Augustine warned against reading Genesis as a scientific text in his “literal” commentary on Genesis. We know that Augustine was trained in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle prior to his conversion and continued to draw upon these philosophical resources to enrich his theology. He derives his understanding of the relation of science and theology from the Greek tradition which recognized a hierarchy of sciences. Because metaphysics deals with those things that do not change, and physics with those things that do change, natural science, or physics, falls below metaphysics in this hierarchical scheme. Aristotle held that physics tells us how the natural world works, but only metaphysics can tell us what the world actual is. Augustine simply Christianizes Aristotle’s “Metaphysics.” As Augustine saw it natural science tells us how the world works, but theology tells us what the world actually is. I.e. we might say that natural science tells us how the world has evolved, whilst it is incapable of explaining those things that do not change (like the relation between creature and Creator). This hierarchy is further clarified by Thomas Aquinas in the middle ages, who called theology the “Divine Science.” Thomas held that theology “has room” for the explorations of the natural world as effects resemble their causes. Theologians could apply these scientific findings analogously to the relationship between creature and Creator (as cause to effect). However, the findings of natural science were simply not capable of displacing theological claims as one might envisage this today, but rather served to buttress our understanding of creation and its relation to the Creator. In this way Thomas understood natural science as a “handmaiden” to the “Divine Science.”

Today, when this distinction is not properly understood, either science itself becomes a faith, or faith becomes science. The former is the fallacy of the new atheists, the latter, of the Christian fundamentalist. And it is to the latter that Augustine addresses his scathing warning:

“There is knowledge to be had, after all, about the earth, about the sky, about the other elements of this world, about the movements and revolutions or even the magnitude and distances of the constellations, about the predictable eclipses of moon and sun, about the cycles of years and seasons, about the nature of animals, fruits, stones and everything else of this kind. And it frequently happens that even non-Christians will have knowledge of this sort in a way that they can substantiate with scientific arguments or experiments. Now it is quite disgraceful and disastrous, something to be on one’s guard against at all costs, that they should ever hear Christians spouting what they claim our Christian literature has to say on these topics, and talking such nonsense that they can scarcely contain their laughter when they see them to be “toto caelo,” as the saying goes, wide of the mark. And what is so vexing is not that misguided people should be laughed at, as that our authors should be assumed by outsiders to have held such views, to the great detriment of those about whose salvation we are so concerned, should be written off and consigned to the waste paper basket as so many ignoramuses.

                Whenever, you see, they catch out some member of the Christian community making mistakes on a subject which they know inside and out, and defending their hollow opinions on the authority of our books, on what grounds are they going to trust those books on the resurrection of the dead and the hope of eternal life and the kingdom of heaven, when they suppose they include any number of mistakes and fallacies on matter which they themselves have been able to master either by experiment or by the surest of calculations? It is impossible to say what trouble and grief such rash, self-assured know-alls cause the more cautious and experienced brothers and sisters. Whenever they find themselves challenged and taken to task for some shaky and false theory of theirs by people who do not recognize the authority of our books, they try to defend what they have aired with the most frivolous temerity and patent falsehood by bringing forward these same sacred books to justify it. Or they even quote from memory many things said in them which they imagine will provide them with valid evidence, not understanding either what they are saying, or the matters on which they are asserting themselves (1 Timothy 1.7).”-Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book I, Article 39.

Notes: I should clarify what the church fathers meant by the term “literal.” Quite simply, it did not mean what it does today. All I shall say is that “literal” doesn’t mean that the Genesis account is to be read as a scientific text that is replete with historical facts, but rather “literal” meant that we should determine what the creation account is telling us about who we are in relation to God.

Lecture: “Darwin’s Pious Idea” by Dr Conor Cunningham

Dr. Conor Cunningham’s lecture on “Darwin’s Pious Idea” delivered at the Oxford Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion. The video can be viewed here

Philosophy, Theology, and Tim Tebow

I find that a brisk walk in the morning really stimulates my mind. It’s a great way for any PhD student to start the day. This morning on my walk to campus I found myself again reflecting on philosophical and theological concepts. I was deep in thought contemplating… Tim Tebow.

For what it’s worth, I’m a huge football fan. I’ve been watching football for as long as I can remember. I’ve played and coached, and I, like so many others my age, still like to reminisce about my high school days a la “Uncle Rico.” But it stops there. I am no sportswriter, or analyst, and like most fans I do not know the “ins and outs” of football. But I do claim to know a few things about the way people think. And this is why all that which surrounds Tim Tebow intrigues me.

First I should say that I’m a huge fan of Tim Tebow. I have followed him since his high school years, through his success at Florida, and now as a Denver Bronco. Now alas, plenty of you will check out here, because the rest of what I have to say is driven by a fascination that makes it impossible for me to see the blatantly obvious fact that Tim Tebow is not, nor will he ever be, a “successful NFL quarterback.” But please, don’t write me off so quickly. I implore you to humor me if just for a moment…

I find it quite amusing when I hear commentators time and time again say that Tim Tebow is not a “good quarterback.” In philosophy “is” statements address existence at its most fundamental level. This means that before determining if Tim Tebow is not a “good QB,” one first has to define what a “good quarterback” is. In doing so, we can clarify underlying assumptions. Thus, we may ask, what is one assuming when they say Tim Tebow is not a “good quarterback?” I want to argue that anyone who says Tim Tebow is not a good QB assumes that the “goodness” of an NFL QB can be reduced to his ability to throw a ball accurately, full stop. I state emphatically that all of the criticism that I have heard (regarding Tim Tebow’s playing ability) can be reduced to his accuracy. But is this really all a good QB is?

A common error of the last few hundred years of thought is that the parts precede the whole. This is called “reductionism;” the theory that everything can and should be reduced to its parts. We proceed from the parts to get to the whole, but the whole isn’t real. It’s just what you get when you put all the parts together. How does this relate to football?

The obsession with statistics (helped most recently by fantasy football) has led to the reduction of a player to his quantifiable statistical make up. Players are increasingly defined by their statistics. The assumption made is that the statistic is the player. But this is NOT the case.

To cite an analogy: In quantum physics theorists have realized that their definition of particles says nothing about the being of the particle (the actual particle). The measuring devices used are only giving data and measurements, but because this data is not the particle they admit that they really know nothing about the particle itself. This is because in physics any qualitative assessment is disregarded and precedence is given to that which is quantifiable (I should note that as a result theorist have been willing to incorporate qualitative analyses). The assumption is that quality is not real; it only exists in one’s mind, and therefore need not be considered.

But I want to argue that the question of “being,” although quantifiable in the terms addressed above, always is a question of quality. It turns out that we do have the ability to see quality in the world (thank God for commentators like Skip Bayless). Quality is real, and it can be assessed! “Being,” properly assessed, acknowledges the parts, but only in light of the whole. Although its quantifiable parts are distinguishable, the whole is always qualitative. Many commentators and fans alike cannot wrap their minds around the success of Tim Tebow because they reduce him to parts (I should add that without the whole there are no such things as a “persons” so we’d better be careful of how we talk of athletes.).

Now if I am correct, it would seem that to reduce Tim Tebow, or any other player, to their statistics, and even worse only one statistic (in Tebow’s case: accuracy) seems rather naïve, and I would go as far as to say, nihilistic. No one, including a “successful quarterback” in the NFL, should be reduced to his parts.

There’s more. As Tebow continues to win his harshest critics will stop at nothing to insist on quantitative analysis. It’s rather twisted. Instead of applying statistics negatively, they use them positively. They award the success of the Broncos to the defense based upon their statistics. (I am in no way denying that Denver’s defense has been nothing short of brilliant). The point I am trying to make is that no one takes it seriously when the senior leaders of the Denver defense have said with their own mouths that Tim Tebow inspires them. Why? because that’s a qualitative assessment and that’s not real. Remember, we’ve fallen prey to the illusion that only quantifiable statistics are real. Statistics are here positively manipulated against Tebow: the Broncos success is reduced to their defensive statics, not the whole of the team. Now the defense has been reduced.

Now on to more practical matters that further relate to our discussion. I heard a commentator recently say something like, “let’s see how Tebow holds up when he’s hit 20 times a game?” What does he mean by this? Running backs typically get hit on every play of the game and no one is worried about Adrian Peterson getting hit. What the commentator is assuming is that QB’s can’t get hit because they aren’t tough enough. When did that happen? It is true that today QB’s are thought of as fragile, and most are in fact more fragile, because the game has evolved. Nowadays, it’s a financial risk to pay a QB that much money and have him run the ball. All of this contributes to the reduction of the QB to his ability to throw the ball accurately. This is nowhere more obvious than in the case of Tim Tebow. Why?, because if most other quantifiable categories (turnovers, yards per carry, wins, touchdown to int. ratio, etc.) were considered, as it stands today, Tebow would be considered amongst the elite QBs in the league. Is Tebow getting hit really an issue, just because it’s an issue for others?

All if this alludes to the fact that the definition of a “good” QB (as I have cited pejoratively) is also driven by the evolution of the game towards a passing style offense (i.e. the “west coast” offense). In this scheme, the QB’s throwing ability increasingly defines him; he becomes the most important player on the team, and is therefore paid the most. We find ourselves urging QB’s not run the ball, and every year there seems to be more and more rules installed to “protect” him. The success and failures of a team revolves more around the QB than ever before (the demise of the Colts following their loss of Manning is a quintessential example). No one today believes a team can win a Super Bowl with a mediocre QB, (even after the Ravens did so).

Lastly I ask, what are the qualities that make a QB successful? Let’s again use Peyton Manning as an exemplar. Leadership, passion, determination, a knack for unifying people, hope, honor, character, pride, humility, composure, level-headedness, drive, consideration of others, encouragement, decisive decision making etc. No one would argue that Peyton Manning is among the greatest QBs to ever play the game. These same qualities could be attributed to Tim Tebow.

What if we’re all in Plato’s cave, watching the images of a “successful quarterback.” What if Tim Tebow is leading us to see that the way we’ve always seen things is only a shadow of a better more complete player; a whole player.

But it’s even more than that. He forces us to examine what we are as a whole, that we are not defined by how much we make, or our profession, but who we are in the deepest parts of our being. He has caused all of us to look at the things that we assume when we measure ourselves and others. He begs the question to us all, what defines you? What makes you successful? If you look deep enough I think you’ll find that it’s not quantifiable.

Tim Tebow is changing our ways of thinking just like the Man he follows has been doing for over 2000 years.

Science, Theology, and the Ecological Crisis

In 1967 Lynn White published, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” wherein he provides a brief and penetrating analysis of the origin of our current ecological crisis: “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis.”

White claims that our current crisis is largely religious and can therefore only be solved by religion. More specifically, it is a product of a theological misunderstanding of man’s relationship to creation: a violent separation of spirit from nature (natura pura), which today is almost universally held by christians and non-christians.He argues that this view of creation is far removed from early Christians who read nature as a symbol of God (marked by God.) The solution therefore is not in the development of new technology, but in re-envisioning the entire cosmos as participating in God. He cites Francis of Asissi whose “view of nature and of man rested on a unique sort of pan-psychism of all things animate and inanimate, designed for the glorification of their transcendent Creator, who, in the ultimate gesture of cosmic humility, assumed flesh, lay helpless in a manger, and hung dying on a scaffold” (an incarnate world). He concludes, “hence we shall continue to have a worsening ecologic crisis until we reject the Christian axiom that nature has no reason for existence save to serve man.”

Thoughts?…

further clarification on the analogia entis…

again, for now ill leave open theism aside and answer your questions directly. as you said, and i agree, open theism is not a worldview in that it doesn’t nor does it claim to, account for an entire system, or metaphysic, if you will… I think its best to stay on the subject of analogy and hash that about before we even begin to discuss the implications of open theism as it relates to analogy of being…

So your questions:

Evil? Privation, participation etc.: absolutely thomas holds to a theory of privation (I think he wrote 1000 pages on evil called de malo). this is key as i mentioned. whatever language one wants to use there is more ‘intensity’ (john milbank’s terminology) in relationship to god or less. i think this is what you are saying. however, i dont think annihilation is possible in this understanding, and i dont think its faithful to the biblical testimony nor the tradition. now, personally if find annihilation to be an ad hoc way of dealing with theodicy. heres why: the most important thing about privation is that it is a privation of the good or god. and since, for platonists, and for thomas, only the good is reasonable, this means attempts to describe evil will always be unreasonable, as only the good is reasonable. What one ends up doing with annihilation is using the goodness of god to descibe evil. Id rather just describe hell, whatever the hell it is, as being really distant from god, which in my limited experience…sucks.

whats the difference between analogy epistemology, metaphysics, dualism etc.?: Great question, and im not sure everyone will agree with me on this but ill tell you what i think from my studies in light of the analogy of being so here it goes…

Aquinas opens the summa theologica with this very question. you can read the first couple articles here:
http://www.op.org/summa/summa-Iq1.html
Its absolutely brilliant, in my opinion (just read the question then the part where he says “on the contrary” and “i answer that” if you want to move through quickly).

here is how i would set this up this hierarchy based on my reading of thomas…

Divine Science-”theology” (analogia entis)
Metaphysics-Ontology
Metaphysics-epistemology
Physics-natural science

first and foremost theology, the divine science, subsumes or informs all of the below (this would be analogous to god being transcendent in that although above all he is intimately involved in the smallest details- so hes also immanent).

In physics and natural science and epistemology we are simply discovering something thats already there (thomas is clear on this). this is not really metaphysical, unless ontology or existence comes first. we couldnt know unless we first existed. So unlike modernity that claims to know without an account of existence (descartes’ “i think therefore i am”) philosophy always began with ontology. when one begins with ontology we find that we dont absolutely know epistemologically what we thought we knew, because there are so many other things to consider (phenomenology has entirely destroyed epistemology, in my opinion). metaphysics, distinct from physics or natural sceince that is deduced simply from that which is revealed to us (like several epistemological claims), requires higher order thinking beyond that which is naturally revealed to us, while  it does maintain that an ontology can be deduced from the phenomenal world around us (so epistomology and ontology arent separate).

Now thomas takes this a step beyond plato and aristotle, whereby he posits what he calls divine science (theology), as i have said and i hope answers your question, by placing it beyond ontology or metaphysics because ultimately god is above or beyond logic he’s analogical=meaning above logical (or no words can descibe him-the apophatic element). all of this is to say that one can get really close to knowing god and reasoning towards him but to ultimately know him in relationship, an element is faith is absolutely necessary which moves us to the top of reason, and beyond, this is what thomas would call revelation. This is why for thomas god is transcendent or at times unsayable, but through the logos he is also immanent in creation made possible by the incarnation (this is how we know God). so… its ok to talk about epistemology or what one ‘knows,’ but one must be able to articulate how one comes to know. So yes, all doctrines are epistemological, but that doesnt make them correct. ontology, and better yet, divine science, is how truth is revealed. good doctrine, should be undergirded by a strong ontology (in my opinion the analogia entis).

Dualism: ive already explained this i think to someone on the message board. basically a dualism is only epistemological. if one holds to the analogia entis then there is no ontological dualism. essentially, in the analogy of being, everything shares in being, and therefore no things are entirely different but rather distinct. if one does not accept this claim what we have is something close to nihilism (see below). in other words things lose there connection to one another, and in this sense a world can be concieved as separate from god (this is not the christian story). a lack of ontology makes atheism a logical option that never really existed before modern times.

what do you mean by ‘in our times:‘ sorry i wasnt clear there. by causality in our time i didnt mean that to be temporal or chronological ‘time.’ I meant in modern times we tend to talk of causality as simply efficient causation (like modern science push and pull) and maybe if we are christians we might mention the first cause or a big bang. but aristotle and later theologians, and certainly thomas, referred to four causes 1. first cause 2.formal cause 3. efficient cause and 4. final cause or telos. all i was saying is that there is more to the predestination free will debate than efficient cause which is typically the only causation discussed. i dont have time to go into all this but i hope you can see why others are important in that discussion

am i positing a nature-supernature dualism?: as i tried to allude to in the initial post, absolutely not. What i am saying is that without analogy one will tend toward dualism. for thomas grace perfects nature, so in a way a graced nature is a supernature. like with being there is no material entirely devoid of being (perhaps even grace as some theologians have suggested), while on the other end is the incarnate christ the perfect example of the nature/grace relationship which we all strive towards.

Regarding a need for changing the language here- determinism; free will sentient beings etc.?: it is impossible at this point to avoid subtle hints towards what i see as an error in openness. what i am describing, and what i have describe throughout, is a lack of ontology in modern theology, and this includes open theism. It is simply not a controversial subject to those trained in philosophical theology that god holds all the attributes he does and still allows for free-will or what opennes might call libertian free-will. I hope it has been made clear that when one tries to posit god, based on epistemology (or logic), rather than analogy, the result is a god that is reduced to our epistemological claims (we define god, he doesnt define us, he becomes an object… this is not good). If one acknowledged ontology or read the philosophical tradition of christianity they would find that a ‘new god’ is entirely unnecessary. what happens here is one sees an epistemological error in the free-will/predestination debate, and re-creates god (epistemologically) to get around it, thereby actually giving voice to the dualism. This is a huge error, and it reduces god to a set of logical propositions, precisely what thomas and the analogia entis avoids. This is why god is transcendent and requires faith to believe in. revelation and will never be entirely logical. Instead, why not go back and just read the tradition and see how the free-will predistation issue surfaces and fix the problem there, instead of positing a ‘new god’ that is otherwise entirely unnecessary?

for what its worth, in quantum physics, scientist have realized they have a huge epistemological crisis on their hands. they see that they simply measure ‘objects’ data and giving results and probabilities based on this data, but the data is not the actual thing they are observing. they are finding that the ‘thing’ they observe lies at a deeper level than their epistemological conclusions. this is why quantum physics is now open to ontological talk, because they realize how important it is. this is also why theologians and scientist can now dialogue with some of these scientist that are ready to admit they could use some input from philosphy. in doing so, some q physicists are also now beginning to call the universe both determined, and chaotic, or free. this all goes back to what aquinas said nearly 1000 years ago. and some of these theories are not far from platos forms.

all openness is saying is for man to really have free-will the future must remain open?  that’s it, full stop. and then a small bit about theodicy which works well with this type of logic. logically, this makes sense if one doesnt understand analogy, but as i have continually tried to point out, this is very poor philosophy (as one of my colleagues said, the openness issue, wouldnt be an issue if people knew what she learned in A-level (high school) philosophy.

one can go about talking about the libertarian free will and how precisely based on the past one is limited in their future and therefore the future is open all they want, but at the end of the day, god does know the future, jesus wasnt an ad hoc correction to something that went wrong. (regardless of what man chose or did not choose). but man also has free-will even if its limited. regarding god as ‘presentist’ this is still no ontology, besides the fact that this again, philosphically, is a really sophmoric understanding of the concept of time, I really dont have time to go into all the implications of a sort of veiw but philosophically it runs into so many contradictions right off the bat. ultimately openness, from start to finish lacks a robust incarnation altogether.

Althought i would no go this far, I know a very well known christian philosophical theologian, conor cunningam, who terms these types of theology as “anonomous atheism,” because without knowing it they are positing a god outside of the christian tradition and the biblical testimony, because once one removes analogy one ends up with something very close to nihilism-without analogy, as mentioned above. how else does one make the connection between god and his creation?…

Free-Will/Predestination and the analogia entis

I recently submitted the following blog to theomag.com which prompted a need for further clarification of the analogia entis (analogy of being). This clarification took place over email with someone who subscribes to openness theology (this is why there are references to open theism below). My response is included below the initial post for those interested in a very amateur explanation of the analogia entis

What’s all this debate about pre-destination and free-will?[1]

With both sides having valid biblical resources to draw upon, how are they to be reconciled?

For Thomas Aquinas, God is not a being that is included in a metaphysical system. Therefore God’s agency differs from ours. This means that when we compare how God acts in the world (Divine agency, or will) to how humans act in the world (human will) a careful ‘distinction’ (not ‘difference’[2]) must be maintained. If this ‘distinction’ is not maintained, we get…bad theology.

Philosophers and theologians have two common terms they employ in discussions like ours (they really like them for ontological discussions like when they ask, “what is ‘being?’ but they work for our topic too because they are related). These terms are: univocal and equivocal. Put simply, univocal means ‘sameness,’ equivocal means ‘difference.’ Juxtaposed, these two terms form a dualism, which we should always try to avoid in Christian theology.

What does this have to do with predestination and free-will? Well, this is precisely what is taking place behind the scenes in this ‘modern’ debate. What we have is “a plague on both houses;” two sides, using the same logic, forming a dualism that cannot be overcome without addressing the underlying metaphysic from which it emerges. In one corner stands the “Armenians” (free-will), and in the other, those we call “Calvinists” (predestination). The latter tend to think of God’s relation to mankind univocally. This means that when God acts upon us we are simply passive recipients of His will (the choice is entirely God’s). Furthermore, our actions are entirely directed by God, as is the future of the world (determinism). In an odd way, His will is our will. The former, however, tend to think of this relationship equivocally, whereby God’s will is entirely different from the human will. Thus the active choice of the human will determines not only one’s own destiny, but the plight of the entire cosmos. Entirely separate from God’s will, the human will can be for or against God’s will, it may even determine God’s will (one may see how following this logic of “Open Theism” becomes a viable theological option… unfortunately). Now these are obviously exaggerated, oversimplified examples. But, this is done for two reasons: 1) to exemplify how far this logic takes us; and 2) to reveal that dualism really doesn’t exist (but, only conceptually). For God’s sake, there must be something that works better than this. There must be another option.

The opening paragraph states that when a ‘distinction’ is not maintained the inevitable result is dualism. Here is the important part: between the dualism of univocal and equivocal language there exists analogy. Analogy is often employed theologically because it maintains a ‘distinction’ (between an apparent dualism) but not a complete difference (as in the case of dualism). Analogy suspends ‘sameness’ and ‘difference.’

In pre-modern times analogy was frequently employed in metaphysical attempts to explain the objective nature of ‘being’ when human understanding proved inadequate. Thomas Aquinas understood the necessity of analogy and would be surprised and certainly disappointed with the sort of dualism that emerged in the centuries following his death. Aquinas was a master at employing analogy. Relevant to our topic, Aquinas extends the use of analogy to explain the relations of divine and human agency. In utilizing analogy he suspends univocal and equivocal language. In following the Platonic tradition, Aquinas states that “God has immediate providence over everything…even the smallest.” It is, therefore, God who “gives them the power to produce those effects” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia. q. 22 a. 3). Stopping here suggests a univocal explanation of God’s agency. As we have earlier suggested, this response lends itself to doctrines of predestination as all human activity is controlled by God’s agency. Aquinas, however, does not stop here. In this portion of his treatise on agency one would expect Aquinas to offer an equivocal response to his initial claim. But Aquinas is careful not to counter with a dualism; rather, he completes his explanation by slightly amending his primary statement. He continues that, “there are certain intermediaries of God’s providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures” (Ibid). Out of God’s “goodness” creatures act as “intermediaries” that participate in God’s plan.

In his apophatic style, Aquinas realizes the limits of language and is careful to avoid strict univocal or equivocal categorization of God. In doing so Aquinas portrays human actions as subject to God, yet free. Humans therefore, “do not create in the strict sense, but they are not denied a role in the temporal achievement of the realization of the idea.” (Robert C. Miner, Truth in the Making: Creative Knowledge in Theology and Philosophy, 9). Humans then, work in a way that mirrors the divine, creative power without usurping it (Miner, 34).

This is just one of the many dualisms that continue to plague Reformation and Post-Reformation theology. What should be clear is this underlying theological issue emerged with the concomitant loss of analogy and the advent of Nominalism (numerous books have been dedicated to this issue; so much so, that it is simply ‘old news’ to theologians and philosophers).

In closing, I hope that the reader takes away three points from this article; 1) modern thought is fraught with dualisms; 2) there is no place for dualisms in the Christian tradition; and 3) a point that wasn’t mentioned but can now be deduced, most contemporary attacks on Christianity are directed against this sort of bad theology, and in fact it was bad theology that opened up a space for this opposition (dualism). Following this, I want to suggest that a rich understanding of the Christian theological tradition is the only apologetic in our current climate. So next time someone asks you if you’re an Armenian or a Calvinist tell them you’re a little bit of both, or better yet, tell them that dualisms are not a part of the tradition. The latter response will always leave pop-culture atheists confused, and scrambling for a more robust critique of Christianity.


[1] The theologically minded will no doubt chuckle at the lack of theological and philosophical depth of the following explanations. This is in no way intended to be an adequate account of the intricacies of the analogia entis or causality in the Thomistic corpus. But rather, it is a horrendous oversimplification of inconsistencies in Reformation/Post-Reformation theology that is intended to shed light on a much broader metaphysical issue which underlies these respective fields. By doing so, I hope to point evangelical readers beyond one of several ‘modern’ dualisms that simply do not exist in the orthodox Christian tradition. Thomas Aquinas is cited because he is the theologian par excellence who masterfully and intentionally avoided this metaphysical issue throughout his work.

[2] By “not difference” I mean that there is an analogical relation between the way Divine and human agency are be related. Analogy indicates that things can be ‘distinct,’ but not utterly ‘different.’ This is further clarified below.

———————————————————————————————————–

Clarification: (my response to questions over email)

thanks again. what is that analogy of being, and how does it overcome our topic? ill do my best to answer these as concisely as possible without references here and without any reference whatsoever to open theism so im not misreading it. its just best to leave that out. I want to say that i personally dont think the platonists were top down, aristotle although a platonist was a bit, but thomas certainly not. participation is both horizontal and vertical in plato, and in the christian neoplatonists, no question. As i said before lots of people have skewed views of classical theism, and i really dont think they read plato or aristotle or aquinas. otherwise they would not make those claims. there are just lots of bad modern readings of it. im actually writing my disseration on this, because as youve said, its important.

I hope this makes sense but this is a heavy theological discussion thats been waging for centuries. sorry for the length, there are several books out there on this and im no expert at all, im a first year phd student, there are plenty of people that have done a much better job than i could ever attempt to do.

the analogy of being: in the relation of god and man, we have three choices of being: 1. our being or esse is the same as gods (univocal), 2. our being is different from gods (equivocal), 3. its a little bit of both (analogical). so, as with most doctrines in the faith the third seems to be the ‘truth’ if we are to hold to the biblical account of god and man and the incarnation. Therefore analogy has become a defining way to talk of God (see 4th lateran counsel). Once this was decided, subsequent Scholastic Thomists, in their attempts to formulate a doctrine of the analogia entis (which thomas never did!), ended up using ratio by misreading thomas. this ends up in the modern critique of thomas calling him a univocist (as you have mentioned).

But this, as i have tried to point out is a modern misreading of aquinas. aquinas purposely use what is called analogy of attribution by citing an example of ‘health,’ to explain the analogy of being and the relation between god and man to avoid this type of language.

Jean-Luc Marion refers to this the univocist drift that analogy undergoes with scholastics like Suárez and others. The largest failure could very well have been the attempt to make analogy metaphysical. To make analogy logical and perhaps epistemological, where “being” or ontology is subordinate to logic. From here on out analogy was all but lost from theological endeavors and rarely shows its face, but in small strands of theologians, that in my opinion, really understood the tradition (like de lubac, nouvelle theologie, DBH the cambridge platonists, and John Milbank etc.).
Here is where i pick up in my post to show that in modernity we now have epistemological doctrines that lack an account of being, and begin to develop theology in this way. hence the free will predestination division (as a small example).

How does thomas overcome this: i want to just note something in dont have time to articulate, the fact that causality in our time is considered only as first cause and efficient cause, whereas thomas following aristotle held to a first, efficient, formal (cant have without analogy), and final cause. Regardless, the real thomas constantly utilized in the platonic theory of participation (a word used probably more than any other in his corpus, so i dont know how anyone could ever read him as a determinist or equivocally, or univocally, because participation only works with analogy). It is THE crucial aspect in the analogy of being. THis means that while god is being, creation participates or shares in that being. God is being, we have being (analogicallly). Why analogically? If god is one (im not denying the trinity) and we share univocally, we would then reduce his being as we would have a part of it (panentheism). But rather, and to give you an ‘attributive’ analogical example of this would be to say Mike is good, and bill is good, mike and bill share in goodness, but this doesnt reduce or change what goodness is. otherwise the ‘good’ (to use platonic language) is reducible because we have a ‘part’ of it. this is why god is unique altogether and our sharing in his being doesnt reduce who he is, but it also doesnt disconnect us from him in relationship.

Now the crucial thing about the analogy of being is that it applies to not just to our topic but to the entire account of creation. its not just an ad hoc theological principal used to describe our topic. Most fundamentally it sustains everything. This is the beauty of it. It is the ontology of christianity and i would argue it is what separates christianity from all other faiths. It is the heart of the incarnation. God creates the world, and sustains it, through the logos. the entire creation remains in analogical relation to the godhead through jesus. he is the completion, if you will, of the analogy.

Now here is the beautiful part to me (which i hint at in my post): In the 4th Lateran council (and displayed in the work of thomas which i note), a decision was made that even with the analogy of being, there would always be an apophatic element (a negative statement to follow). this means that whenever positive statements are made about god or articulated by the analogia entis, i.e. creation shares in god, a negative statement would alway be posited following this because they believed that even statements like these could never be fully knowable without the element of faith. so in other words, the analogy of being is as close as we can get to understanding all of this, but it still requires an element of faith, in christ the logos, who is analogically holding this together…. somehow (at this point you have to believe).

Analogy of being is really beautiful for so many other reasons, sacraments, the relation of nature and supernature, etc. but i have already taken too much time. In other words it works for all of creation, not just our topic. Its even emerging in quantum physics, as scientist are moving beyond classical physics. I hope this makes sense, even if you dont agree.

How does all this relate to the topic: Im not going to use the traditional free-will or predestination terminology here cause thats always a turn off. For thomas, creation participates in god. man, sits at the hierarchy of creation and therefore is given the most freedom or self determination (man sins plants dont, man has freewill, plants dont). Man in participation, by grace, “co-operates” (this is a common word used by thomas) with god to complete gods plan. the best way i could describe it would be like a soccer coach (god) lays out a gameplan for his team (creation) but they play the game (the coach’s mark-the gift of being through grace- is left on the team as they play and in a way they are both responsible for the outcome). I know this is a horrible example but i think it suits how thomas suspends the two sides. (and in all honesty you and i both know no one, outside the audacity of modern science ever viewed the world as entirely ‘determined’). so analogically speaking, man couldnt do anything if god didnt create him, put limitations on him, and is continually sustaining him (i hate to use the term, but in these ways, god determines mans ways), but on the other side man was created with free will to make choices and cooperate in gods plan no entirely free, because of limitations.

What the analogy of being does, is that it actually explains how this all can be conceived, ontologically, as a foundation of our epistemology, and is the story of the incarnation (which unfortunately is nearly absent in the protestant tradition) as ive tried to articulate briefly. I truly believe that the loss of analogy is the reason why christianity today finds itself as a religion amongst others, because without a strong ontology we are another religion (again in our rational articulation), and it bad ontology gives room for a secular space that isnt there (im sure you are hearing the radical orthodoxy coming out)

thanks again for reading all of this, i did my best to explain a centuries old tradition in an email…

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